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A Matter of Personal Choice 
Bing Bing Jia 
Abstract 
 
This short Essay is a comment on the Lead Essay of the Symposium. It seeks to make 
two points from personal observation. First, an approach for study, research, and practice in 
international law depends on the purpose the work of an international lawyer seeks to serve. 
Second, in terms of methodology, the social science approach overlaps to some degree with other 
approaches. The proposition drawn from the two points is that an approach, being individualistic 
in nature, is a matter of personal choice, unsuitable for general consumption.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The social science approach to international law, as described in the main 
essay by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg (Lead Essay), is at once ambitious and 
modest.1 It is ambitious as it can account for a number of publications that have 
earned awards at the annual conferences of the American Society of International 
Law since 1990.2 In the Lead Essay, the social science approach is held up as a 
way to study and research international law that apparently displaces two 
assumptions3 shared by Oppenheim and the contributors to the American Journal 
of International Law Symposium of 1999.4 It is modest because the social science 
approach is one of the several known approaches for study and research in 
international law; thus, the Lead Essay does not claim to propose a new approach.5 
Moreover, upon closer inspection, the basic methods representative of that 
approach seem to be familiar to international lawyers,6 even if these lawyers may 
not have embraced the methods fully. 
Not to survey and evaluate again the existing approaches in international 
legal scholarship, which have been summarized admirably in both the Lead Essay7 
and the conclusion to the Symposium of 1999, 8  the present author would 
immediately make clear at the beginning of this short Essay that his approach is 
close to Oppenheim’s positivist approach,9 drawing where appropriate on the 
 
1  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021). 
2  See id. at 3 n.13. 
3  Id. at 4–5. The two assumptions are (1) the shared omission that international law should be 
conventional social science, and (2) the shared conception that international legal scholarship is 
focused on studying the substantive obligations of international law. 
4  See Symposium On Method in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999) [hereinafter 
Symposium of 1999] for the contributions and the conclusion. See generally Steven R. Ratner & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 291 (1999). 
5  Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 7 (“Our goal is thus not to identify new trends. . .[I]nstead, it is to more 
fully describe and justify this social science approach than prior efforts.”). 
6  See id. at 14–15. It appears that the terms “approach” and “method” are used interchangeably in the 
Lead Essay, as well as in the Symposium of 1999. There may be a fine distinction between these 
two terms, in that the former captures the main feature of the usual way in which a lawyer deal with 
the discipline or issues of international law, whereas the latter seems to signify the actual steps 
undertaken by the lawyer in such dealings. Whether the distinction is correct is open to further 
consideration. 
7  See id. at 7–15. 
8  See generally Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Method Is the Message, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
410 (1999). 
9  In this author’s view, Oppenheim’s list of seven tasks for international lawyers still rings largely true 
today. See L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 
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present author’s experience with others. International law, in short, is a profession 
that combines the academic and practical sides. Given past efforts by eminent 
lawyers,10 there is no need to defend the positivist approach in this Essay. Indeed, 
it would be unusual if a positivist lawyer queried whether international law exists 
as law. 
In light of the Lead Essay, two comments will be given. The points which 
they seek to address are first sketched out at this juncture. 
First, a debate about approaches to a discipline is generally interesting, but 
the approach definitive of international lawyers, academic or practicing, depends 
on the purpose their work aims to serve. They learn the ropes by way of study, 
research, teaching, publication, legal drafting, advocacy, and litigation. Their 
approaches are formed over a lifetime, driven by the purpose of their work. 
Second, existing methods, or at least those of some international lawyers, 
may not differ much in nature from those employed by the social science 
approach as advocated in the Lead Essay. The suitability of methods for the study 
and research of international law perhaps depends on the identity of the intended 
audiences, such as students, professors, government lawyers, independent 
counsel, arbitrators, and judges. As different audiences have different expectations 
of this discipline, the presumption is that the motley collection of methods can 
coexist and inform each other. 
The proposition to be established in this Essay is that personal approaches,11 
however defined, may not be suitable for general consumption.12 An approach is 
personal when it is formed through the amalgamation of education, training, work, 
and all other life experiences. It is impossible to replicate, let alone replicate with 
a level of success matching that of those who created the approach. Besides, 
personal approaches affect not only the way international law is studied and 
researched, but also the way the law is practiced. As such, personal approaches do 
 
314 (1908). It remains a remarkable list, considering that he wrote it at a time when there was no 
permanent international court in the world. No guidance, therefore, could be derived by him from 
a standing court’s statute that conveniently set out a list of sources of international law. Article 38 
of the Statutes for the Permanent Court of International Law and the International Court of Justice 
provides the contours of a basic approach to international law as applied by judicial institutions. It 
pushes the positivist approach to the forefront of the discipline. In comparison with other 
approaches, Oppenheim’s remains the one that reflects most closely that basic approach of Article 
38. See Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38 ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
10  See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibilities of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 306–08 (1999). 
11  These are personal in that they are created and employed by individual writers and have 
subsequently achieved a degree of general recognition in terms of uniqueness or distinction among 
peers or the individual writers’ followers. 
12  See Marti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 352 (1999) (“[T]he 
conventions of academic analysis about ‘method’ would inevitably fail to articulate its reality.”). 
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not fall neatly under a single label, such as positivism or critical legal studies, 
because they grow and change with personal experiences. 13 
II.  APPROACH IS PURPOSE-DETERMINED  
The point of the first comment is that approach is determined by purpose, 
pursued, and perfected throughout a career to which there is a firm commitment. 
Such a purpose supplies the motivation to study and work in this field. 
Consequently, this Essay is more relevant to established lawyers than to 
students—even though this author teaches students his approach with a clear aim 
that they consider careers in light of that approach, but without any pressure to 
adopt it. 
If the purpose is to study, analyze, or critique international law as a discipline, 
the issue of viability of this system of law, which consists in questions of efficacy 
and compliance, would be high on the list of research questions. Many 
approaches, including the social science approach, have attempted to provide an 
answer and, while doing so, reveal their own external views of international law 
both as an academic discipline and as a legal order.14 There is not, and there need 
not be, a consensus regarding which existing approach is better for this (external) 
purpose. 
If the purpose is, however, to be qualified one day to enter practice in this 
field, the approach would be the one chiefly employed by lawyers and legal 
advisors. Here, a solid knowledge about state practice and caselaw is essential but 
not exclusive of other sources, which has been the hallmark of influential 
international law textbooks in the past.15 This characteristic aligns largely with the 
positivist approach. For a practice-minded lawyer, law is for settling and 
preventing disputes, although innumerable issues accompanying the 
interpretation and application of law for that purpose can also be intellectually 
challenging and often require study and research. Some of those issues may indeed 
require in-depth theoretical studies, and most can become points for arguments 
in disputes between states. In this type of situation, intellectual challenges will have 
to be balanced by the practical consideration of the client’s wishes. 
 
13  There might be some truth to the assumption that the approaches displayed during the Symposium 
of 1999 have all grown out of the positivism first championed by Oppenheim and subsequently 
reflected in the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court 
of Justice. The diversion from positivism, as it were, began to appear when external views emerged 
in legal scholarship. 
14  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 13–15. On the internal and external views, see id. at 5 (citing H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961)). 
15  See, e.g., 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); 2 L. 
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). 
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As a personal choice, the present author prefers the latter to the former as 
the purpose that defines his own approach to international law. This must be 
qualified by saying that his choice has been consequent upon personal 
circumstances, and that he has no intention to assert it as a general approach. 
Moreover, that approach has gradually come to reflect elements of both purposes 
mentioned above. In spite of that convergence, the purpose with practice looming 
large in the background clearly has a greater influence. Ultimately, even the 
purpose of study, research, and teaching is supposed to assist in the realization of 
the grand design of international law as a tool to order international relations and 
settle interstate disputes. That settling disputes and keeping order can be a purpose 
for studying and researching in this discipline may not be surprising given that the 
international relations of today’s world are still dominated by the international 
relations of nation-states, as they were a century ago. This domination is even 
more conspicuous in times of global crisis. While it is recognized that, from a 
doctrinal perspective, different approaches provide interesting and often 
contrasting insights into the nature of this discipline, interest of that kind per se is 
not likely to sustain itself for so long that it leads to persistent efforts in applying 
a particular approach, unless the object of that interest, international law, is also 
useful as a living system of law. On that account, international law cannot exist as 
a pure science, insulated from the real events that are its lifeblood. 
III.  THE POSITIVIST PURPOSE VIEWED INTERNALLY  
The purpose of keeping order and settling disputes primarily among states 
distinguishes international law from municipal law. The constant comparison 
between municipal and international law often hinges upon the relative utility of 
these two bodies of law with respect to similar problems. That may be the cause 
for the rivalry, if any, between them.16 But progressive dualism considers this an 
unlikely scenario, for each operates for its own purpose and within its own context 
without necessarily encroaching upon the purpose the other seeks to uphold.17 
Taking an internal view of the discipline of international law, the positivist 
can, in the course of study or practice, analyze and apply substantive and 
procedural rules of international law covering diverse areas of interests, like 
climate change, the law of the sea, territorial changes, state responsibility, 
international trade practices, international institutions, international human rights, 
and so forth. A study carried out in this broad way is obviously expansive in scope, 
where the existence of a discipline can be quantitatively discerned and qualitatively 
recognized. Moreover, the expansiveness of the subject of international law is 
 
16  See 2 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (COLLECTED PAPERS) 510–18, 548–49 (1975). 
17  See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 68, 71, 
79 (1957). 
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equally palpable to practitioners, as testified to by, among others, the numerous 
intergovernmental organizations that build up practices in a great variety of areas 
of specialty.18 
IV.  APPROACH EVOLVES WITH EXPERIENCE 
The point of my second comment is the following. A personal approach is 
akin to a personal habit, formed in the course of personal development. It would 
be wrong to see it as fixed after the defining work comes out or the approach has 
become a habit. As it evolves with experience, the approach cannot, a priori, 
discriminate among the existing approaches or methodologies; rather, it will be 
likely to absorb elements of the approaches or methodologies along the way, as 
required by the circumstances of current work. 
Some years back, the present author began to work in the area of 
international criminal law, when he came upon a case in which the policy-oriented 
approach had played a decisive role because customary law was silent with respect 
to a particular legal issue arising in the case. The positivistic instinct might be to 
pronounce a non liquet; whereas, in the proceedings, no judge was willing to do 
that, for the personal freedom and individual responsibility of a defendant, as well 
as the credibility of the judicial institution, were on the line. The majority finding 
was reached through a combination of the positivist methodology and a healthy 
dose of policy considerations.19 As a consequence, the personal approach of the 
present author was changed in a way that he never anticipated, and the change, 
albeit in a limited sense, was wrought by the circumstances of that particular case. 
But this recourse to another approach was only possible when the purpose of the 
work demanded an answer. 
V.  RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE 
POSITIVIST APPROACHES  
Labels, such as the ones used in the heading, are used for the sake of 
convenience only. They may conveniently describe the principal characteristics of 
approaches without signifying the comparative worth of a particular approach. It 
is conceivable that there are lawyers who do not care much about the suitable label 
under which they may characterize themselves. 
The social science approach, as described in the Lead Essay,20 is not different 
from the positivist approach in terms of two methods: first, the setting of a 
 
18  See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in the World of Ideas, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 57 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds., 2012). 
19  See Bing Bing Jia, International Case Law in the Development of International Law, 382 RECUEIL DES COURS 
175, 322–25 (2015). 
20  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 5–6. 
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research question; and second, the empirical way to test a hypothesis developed 
from the research question. This may be demonstrated by an example in which a 
government relies on the right of passage through international straits to justify 
continuing use of a waterway bordered by another state. 21 
The positivist starts by focusing on an issue or research question, like 
whether a legal right of passage applies in that particular waterway. No empirical 
research is necessary for claiming the right, which is generally recognized in Part 
III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.22 However, 
an empirical study would be required to test the hypothesis that the waterway in 
question has been used as an international strait, including an assessment of the 
volume of international shipping plying the waterway over a period of time. Here, 
a problem arises in whether the social science approach will pursue the same 
research question. Perhaps that approach is more likely to focus on the question 
of why the coastal state had allowed international shipping to use the waterway 
for a period of time in the past and discontinued it prior to the emergence of the 
dispute. But the positivist will be less concerned with that question than with the 
legal consequences of the discontinuance of the status quo ante. 
In short, methodologically, it may not be easy or necessary to draw a bright 
line between the two approaches. The difference between them probably lies in 
the different research questions posed from the perspectives of international law 
and social science,23 for lawyers and social scientists are interested in different 
aspects of a situation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION :  A  MATTER OF PERSONAL CHOICE  
The starting point for this Essay is the purpose a lawyer seeks to attain 
through studying and working in international law. It is not necessary that lawyers 
always treat the discipline as if they were engaged in practice. To combine study 
and research with practice is, however, an approach that may serve both academic 
and practical purposes. Such an approach can be enriched by borrowing from 
other approaches where appropriate. While it may be unscientific to conclude that 
an approach to this discipline is individualistic, that realist view at least leaves the 
field open to all past, present, and future approaches, so that no lawyers feel 
constrained in pursuit of the purpose they seek to attain in this discipline. 
 
21  See Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. 
v. Russ.), No. 2017-06, Written Observations and Submissions of Ukraine on Jurisdiction, Perm. 
Ct. Arb., ¶¶ 9, 78 (Nov. 27, 2018). 
22  U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
23  This author is aware of the fact that the 1999 Symposium posed a single question of substantive 
law to all contributors and wonders what might be the answer given by a social scientist. 
